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Abstract 
This paper analyses the role of NGOs in the decision-making process of EU legislation on asylum 
and migration. It shows that during the first phase NGOs struggled to benefit from the 
Europeanisation of migration policy. The Commission and European Parliament were the most 
receptive to their lobbying activities, but they had only little influence themselves. NGOs faced many 
problems to follow and influence the Council negotiations. As the institutional context of that time 
had made the Council extremely powerful, the final outcome of the NGO lobbying was close to 
zero. Their shift towards the outsider's tactic by using their moral authority didn't mobilise the public 
either. The Europeanisation of asylum and migration nevertheless provides NGOs with additional 
avenues to use their expert and logistical authority. The current institutional context has strengthened 
their possibilities, though the political climate and the revival of intergovernmental methods 
constraint their successfulness. 
 
Keywords 
NGOs, migration, asylum, EU legislation, negotiations, lobbying, influence, Europeanisation 
 
  
Tineke Strik 
 3 
1. Introduction 
Since the so-called ‘refugee crisis’ in 2015, the migration policy of the European 
Union (EU), is at the centre of the public debate. The EU Council is openly divided 
on which direction it should develop, and many non-state actors seek to influence 
the Member States and Parliament with public statements. The wide media 
coverage of this battle could give the impression of an accessible and transparent 
decision-making process. But is this really the case and which role does civil society 
play in EU migration policymaking? Does the European harmonisation of 
migration policy offer more venues of influence for non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs), or does multilevel decision-making weaken their position? 
This chapter will address these questions while analysing the formation process of 
two EU directives on migration (one on family reunification and one on asylum 
procedures), which laid down the basis of the current EU migration policy. Unless 
referred to other sources, the information and conclusions in this chapter are 
based on my field- and desk research on these formation processes, conducted 
between 2006 and 2010.1 Both directives have been negotiated during the first 
years of this millennium, after the Treaty of Amsterdam had laid down the legal 
basis for asylum and migration legislation in May 1999.2 During that period, the 
Council was the only institute to adopt the directives, as the European Parliament 
only had a right to be consulted by the Council. On the Directive on the right to 
Family reunification, the Council negotiated from the beginning of 2000 to 
September 2003.3 After two years the Belgian Presidency concluded that the 
Council had reached a deadlock and asked the Commission to present a new 
proposal, including the compromises that had been achieved and solutions for the 
controversies.4  The new proposal, which left more room for manoeuvre for the 
Member States, was accepted as a sound basis by the Member States.5 They 
nevertheless needed more than a year to adopt the Directive.6 
 The process to the adoption of the Asylum Procedures Directive had a 
similar pattern. More than a year after presentation of the first proposal in 
October 2000, the Belgian Presidency submitted a request to the Commission to 
draft a new proposal, accompanied by a number of principles that the proposal 
                                         
1 T. Strik, Besluitvorming over asiel- en migratierichtlijnen. De wisselwerking tussen nationaal 
en Europees niveau (Nijmegen 2011). More information on the study under ‘Assessing the 
negotiation process: methodology’. 
2  Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing 
the European Communities and certain related acts - Final Act, Official Journal C 340 , 
10/11/1997 P. 0115. 
3  See the first proposal of the Commission, COM(1999)638, 1 December 1999 and the 
second, COM(2000)624, 10 October 2000, released after the European Parliament had 
adopted its resolution. 
4 Presidency Conclusions - Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01. 
5  COM(2002)225, 2 May 2002. 
6 The Directive on the right to Family Reunification, 2003/86, OJ 3 October 2003, L 
251/12. 
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should adhere to.7 After the Commission had presented its proposal mid 2002, 
the Council reached a political agreement on 30 April, the day before accession 
of ten new EU Member States.8 As it unsuccessfully tried to reach a common list 
of safe countries of origin, it took until December 2005 before the Council 
decided to adopt the directive, which included a procedure for adopting a 
common list in the future.9 
 During the formation of these first directives on migration of third country 
nationals, NGOs struggled to find the most effective strategy to benefit from the 
Europeanisation of migration policy. Their lobby activities resulted in some 
influence prior to and after the Council negotiations, but hardly during the actual 
decisions taken by the Council. As the institutional context of that time had made 
the Council extremely powerful, the final outcome of the NGO lobbying was close 
to zero. In order to understand this limited result, I will elaborate on the objectives 
of the NGOs, the strategies they used to achieve their aims and the factors 
determining their influence. While doing so, I will distinguish between the different 
stages of their activities in relation to the decision-making process as well as the 
different functions that NGOs are ascribed to. In that context I will assess if they 
had and used one or more kinds of authority Schrover, Vosters & Glynn refer to 
in this issue: expert, moral or logistical authority.10  
2. Assessing the negotiation process: methodology 
Since the beginning of this century, the European Union has been working towards 
common rules on legal migration for third country nationals and a European 
Common Asylum System. Now, less than two decades later, this process has 
resulted in an impressive number of first generation directives and a number of 
additional or recast-directives. Although the decision-making process took place 
exclusively within the institutions of the EU, many actors surrounding these 
institutions tried to influence the outcome of this process.  
 The academic debate on the role of NGOs in migration legislative 
procedures is inconclusive. Any common conclusion on the role and influence of 
NGOs however, should start with a common definition of influence. Yet EU interest 
group literature seems to avoid the definition and assessment of influence rather 
                                         
7 See the first proposal, COM(2000)278, 24 October 2000 and Presidency Conclusion no. 
41,  Laeken, SN 300/1/01 REV 1.  
8  See the revised proposal COM(2002)326, 18 June 2002; see the agreement 8771/04 
ASILE 33, 30 April 2004. 
9 Procedures Directive, 2005/85, OJ 13 December 2005, L 326/13. 
10 M. Schrover et. al., ‘NGOs and West European Migration Management (1860s until 
present)’, Journal of Migration History 2019. 
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than address it.11 Influence can be defined along end results, meaning that the 
interest of a lobby group should be reflected in policy outcomes. Michalowitz 
pointed out that if the aimed results are achieved, it cannot necessarily be linked 
to the lobbying activities, even if the outcomes reflect a shift in the initial positions 
of decision-makers. They could be caused by other factors playing a role during 
the negotiations like changes of government or other political developments.12 
The more precise the outcome, such as specific wordings or provisions advocated 
for by NGOs, the more likely that they are derived from their lobbying activities. 
It seems, however, more secure to draw conclusions about the absence of 
influence. If the proposed wordings or provisions are not incorporated in the 
directives, NGOs have apparently been unsuccessful in that regard. It can 
however not be excluded that they were successful in other ways at the same 
time, such as having raised public awareness or strengthened opposition in 
parliaments or other actors involved, as influence has many faces. It is hence 
indeed important to study the activities and the possible results of all domains at 
the same time rather than studying them in isolation.  
 In order to determine the influence of different factors and actors on the 
making of EU migration law, I have assessed the negotiations of the two key 
directives that were the first to be adopted: the Asylum Procedures Directive of 
2005, and the Family Reunification Directive of 2003. Qualitative and empirical 
research is ideally suited for analysing the decision-making process within the 
Council, as factors such as political preferences, attitudes, norms and background 
are hard to measure in quantitative research.13 I analysed the Commission 
proposals and Council documents reflecting the positions Member States took 
during the negotiations, but also the amendments of the European Parliament as 
well as the position papers and press releases of NGOs that tried to influence 
the decision-making process. A structural comparison of the documents led to 
insights into how the debate in the Council developed, but also where and how 
text proposals of NGOs and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) were adopted and how these organisations changed their attitude in 
the course of the process. In addition, I conducted 34 interviews with persons more 
or less closely involved in the decision-making process, in order to gain contextual 
background information and understand the dynamics between the different 
actors. The interviews were semi-structured and included questions on these 
actors’ positions and objectives, but also their perception of which factors and 
actors influenced the negotiations and the final results. Part of the respondents 
                                         
11 I. Michalowitz, ‘Wat determines influence? Assessing conditions for decision-making 
influence of interest groups in the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy, 14:1 January 
2007 132-151, 133. 
12 Michalowitz, ‘Wat determines influence?’, 134. 
13 D. Heisenberg, ‘How should we best study the Council of Ministers?’, in: D. Naurin and H. 
Wallace, Unveiling the Council of the European Union, Games Governments Play in Brussels, 
(London 2008) 261-276. 
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worked at the EU level for the Commission, Council, Parliament, NGOs and 
UNHCR. The other part of the empirical research was conducted at the national 
level. Besides focusing on the objective and behaviour of the actors at EU level, I 
paid special attention to the positions taken at the national level in the 
Netherlands and Germany, during both the decision-making and transposition of 
the directives. I therefore also conducted interviews with officials, politicians and 
NGOs in Germany and the Netherlands.   
 UNHCR takes a special position among the lobbyists. It is an IGO 
(intergovernmental organisation), which works on the basis of its mandate 
granted by the Refugee Convention to promote and monitor state parties’ 
compliance with their treaty obligations. In a declaration to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, which came into force in 1999, the EU committed to involve UNHCR 
in its decisions on asylum matters.14 
3. The negotiation table as a market place 
During the legislative period based on the Treaty of Amsterdam, the decision-
making process on Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) matters centred around the 
Commission and Council, based on their competences granted by title IV of the 
EC-treaty.15 The Commission took the initiative for the draft directives and acted 
as advisor and mediator during the negotiations at the Council.16 The principle of 
unanimity in the Council on Justice and Home Affairs -matters and the limited role 
of the European Parliament (consultation), paved the way for a dominant role for 
national interests. As every single Member State needed to give its consent, it 
had the power to insist on certain amendments, which often contradicted the 
interests of the Commission.17 This intergovernmental approach impeded the 
institutionalisation of an EU migrant inclusion policy.18 Whereas the Commission 
mainly defended the aim of harmonisation at a high protection level for migrants, 
                                         
14 Declaration no. 17 on Article 73k of the Treaty establishing the European Community, 
Final Act, 29 March 1996, Turin.  
15 The legal basis for the Procedures Directive was Article 63 (1) (d) and the basis for the 
Family Reunification Directive was Article 63 (3) (a) EC-Treaty.  
16 Most of the negotiations took place in the Working Group consisting of governmental 
experts. The next higher level was Scifa, consisting of the managers of the department 
involved, and the highest level of officials was COREPER, where the heads of the 
Permanent Representatives (PR) had to reach an agreement before it could be referred 
to the Council of Ministers. The Council could refer the text back to the JHA-Council, where 
experts of the PR solved the outstanding questions and problems of a more technical 
nature. These were the most informal meetings, without translators. See Strik, Asiel- en 
migratierichtlijnen, 45-49.  
17 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 391-393. 
18 See also A. Geddes, ‘Lobbying for migrant inclusion in the European Union: new 
opportunities for transnational advocacy?’, Journal of European Public Policy 7:4 (2000), 
632-649, 634. 
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the ministers of Interior or Justice in the Council primarily aimed for maintaining 
their national legislation and preferably also their national sovereignty. 
Harmonisation as such was not recognised as being in their national interest, 
despite official declarations that claimed the opposite.19 These national aims 
implied that the delegations negotiated according to the non-intervention 
principle: taking a neutral position regarding more restrictive proposals of other 
Member States or even welcoming them as an extra option for their own policy. 
The negotiation table hence transformed into a ‘market of optional provisions’ for 
which delegations’ actions were mutually supportive. This exchange of 
amendments only functioned well regarding proposals which lowered the level 
of protection, as they did not imply extra obligations.  
 As the Council had the final say, it drastically changed the proposals of 
the Commission by lowering the standards and creating more discretion for the 
Member States. The amendments of the European Parliament, which merely 
supported the Commission, were practically ignored. This made the Parliament 
use its competence to bring both directives to the Court of Justice, requesting it to 
annul certain provisions of the directives.20  
 During the negotiation process, the NGOs exerted most influence during 
the preparation stage carried out by the Commission and the consultation stage 
involving the European Parliament. In its proposals the Commission referred to its 
formal consultation channel, which aimed to strengthen the legitimacy of the draft 
directives. Their de facto influence can be derived from certain provisions in the 
proposals of the Commission and opinions of the Parliament which were identical 
to the proposals of the NGOs and UNHCR. The texts that the NGOs and UNHCR 
had successfully promoted towards the Commission and Parliament were however 
deleted or weakened by the Council, or transferred to the preamble of the 
directives. After adoption of both directives, the NGOs successfully advocated 
for an action for annulment by the European Parliament before the Court of 
Justice. Their lobbying activities hence resulted in some influence prior to and 
after the Council negotiations, but hardly during the actual decisions taken by the 
Council. As the institutional context of that time had made the Council extremely 
powerful, the final outcome of the NGO lobbying was close to zero.21 
                                         
19 See for instance the Tampere conclusions of 1999, where the European Council expressed 
the objective of harmonisation of asylum and migration policy, Council document no. 
200/1/99. 
20 See the judgments CJEU 27 June 2006, C-540/03, Parliament against Council and CJEU 
6 May 2008, C-133/06, Parliament against Council. 
21 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 402-405. 
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4. NGOs: their objectives 
Many of the most influential and active pro-migrant lobby groups are human 
rights organisations (Amnesty International, European Council on Refugees and 
Exiles - ECRE-) or church-based organisations (Caritas, Churches Commission for 
Migrants in Europe - CCME-). Where Schrover, Vosters & Glynn distinguish 
between three kinds of authority (expert, moral and logistical authority), the 
groups mentioned here derive their influence from their moral and expert 
authority.22 They underline and promote the importance of a rights-based 
dimension of European integration.23 Their objectives depend on their divergent 
mandates. Amnesty’s only aim was that the directive would be compliant with 
international human rights obligations. Whereas Amnesty avoided using policy 
considerations, ECRE took a position in favour of harmonisation at the highest 
protection level. Its national members determined the framework of reference: 
while Southern Member States were less represented, the position papers of ECRE 
were largely influenced by the northern NGOs. This phenomenon, which similarly 
emerged in the Council, is related to the longer history of immigration (policy) in 
north of Europe. As UNHCR had a formal monitoring competence regarding the 
Member States, its position was stronger than those of NGOs.24 It had for instance 
occasionally the opportunity to attend or even address the Council meetings.  
 The CCME wrote its comments together with other Christian organisations.25 
As so many more NGOs focused on asylum issues, CCME was particularly active 
on the Family Reunification Directive. Aiming to encourage a strong right to family 
reunification, it took two priorities: ensuring that migrants can choose when they 
reunite (opposing waiting periods or age-limits) and that the directive would 
apply to both refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection.  
 The Meijers Committee, an independent think-tank of academics on 
European migration and criminal law, lobbied at the negotiations on both 
directives from a human rights perspective. It also contributed to the work of the 
Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association (ILPA) and Migration Policy Group 
(MPG) which advocated for safeguarding a fair asylum policy, equal treatment 
between third country nationals and EU citizens regarding family reunification 
and rights after admission, such as access to the labour market. In accordance 
with those principles, they presented draft texts called the ‘Amsterdam Proposals’ 
already before the Commission started drafting its proposals based on the 
Treaty of Amsterdam. These documents clearly demonstrated their expert 
                                         
22 Schrover et. al., ‘NGO’s’, 2019. 
23 Geddes, ‘Lobbying for migrant inclusion’, 638. 
24 See the preamble and Article 35 of the Refugee Convention, Article II Protocol and Article 
9 UNHCR Statute.  
25 Its partners were Caritas Europa, COMECE (Commission of the Bishops' Conferences of 
the European Community), ICMC (International Catholic Migration Commission), JRS (Jesuit 
Refugee Service Europe) and QCEA (Quaker Council for European Affairs). 
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authority. Their timing, in particular, created optimal chances for influence, as the 
Commission did not have much reference material at its disposal at that stage. 
 Most of the pro-migrant NGOs involved in lobbying had national and EU 
representatives. ECRE served as a European umbrella organization for the 
national refugee organisations, whereas Amnesty International located in Brussels 
communicated intensively with its departments in the Member States. They both 
faced the common problem of ‘umbrella’ organisations representing the interests 
of sub-national and national organisations, as identified by Streeck, in that 
reliance on horizontal coordination can be a ‘weak substitute for consolidated 
formal organisation at [the] national level’.26 This is particularly the case if a 
horizontal coordination needs to include divergent national policy styles and 
perspectives which are not necessarily compatible.27 
 But the multi-level presence also had a significant added value for both 
levels, as it contributed to their knowledge and thus to their expert authority. 
National NGOs were better informed on the decision-making process and used 
the legal analyses of the Commission proposals made at the EU level. The EU 
offices learned about the particularities of the national policies, which enabled 
them to anticipate certain government positions in the Council, such as explaining 
their agenda for such interventions and warning their fellow negotiators of their 
implications. The German department of Amnesty for instance made its EU office 
aware of the potential effects of the German proposal to include the option of 
the ‘super-safe’ third country concept. The adoption of this concept at the EU level 
would mean that dubious neighbours of the new Member States, such Ukraine, 
Serbia and Russia, attained the status of a safe third country. The respondent 
recalled:  
For a while we did not realise how badly the negotiations developed. But 
suddenly we saw the provision on supersafe third countries, through which 
people can be returned at the border straight away. We said to Brussels: we 
have to give up supporting this process. The day after UNHCR took the same 
position. We were just a little earlier while we had this experience in Germany 
with the Drittstaatregelung, and therefore knew that the directive could not be 
recovered.28  
After the German department of Amnesty had called upon the Member States 
not to adopt the directive, the European NGOs urged the Commission to withdraw 
its proposal. This example of strengthening the lobby by coordinating and 
                                         
26 W. Streeck, ‘Neo-voluntarism: a new European social policy regime?’ in: G. Marks et al. 
(eds), Governance in the European Union (London 1996), p. 64-94, 85. 
27 Geddes, ‘Lobbying for migrant inclusion’, 639. 
28 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 245-249. 
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mobilising divisions at different levels (or sometimes in different countries), shows 
that the NGOs also benefitted from their logistical authority as well.  
5. Multilevel lobbying: the EU level 
Apart from the formal channels like the consultation stage, most NGOs had an 
informal work relationship with the Commission. According to a respondent from 
Amnesty, the officials of the new DG JLS tasked with drafting the legislation on 
migration lacked sufficient expertise on human rights and international refugee 
law. By supporting them with legal arguments for the proposals, Amnesty 
managed to enhance its influence.   
 The NGOs were actually positively surprised about the proposal for the 
Family Reunification Directive. CCME even praised the proposal for the right to 
family reunification and the more favourable rules for refugees.29 NGOs 
however did not claim any success, and explained that the high level of protection 
proposed by the Commission was the result of the fact that the author of the 
Commission proposal had previously worked for an NGO advocating for migrant 
rights. A respondent of the Meijers Committee admitted that the organisation 
deliberately moderated its enthusiasm, as to avoid the Member States becoming 
suspicious. But the proposal anyway led to a furious response from Germany, 
who accused the Commission of only having taken into account the positions of 
NGOs and academics and not the national interests.  
 When the Commission released its proposal for the Procedures Directive, 
most NGOs responded slightly more critically. ECRE rejected the safe third 
country concepts, which were included under pressure of the Member States. It 
opposed the room for national discretion regarding detention, suspensive effect 
during appeal and advocated for stricter criteria. A respondent of ECRE was 
nevertheless positive on the influence of his organisation:  
On other issues we had been successful, such as the right to a personal 
interview, the right to legal aid, safeguards for female asylum seekers. It was 
important that the Commission proposal included these procedural safeguards, 
as it would have been much more difficult to have them inserted after the 
release of the document.30  
UNHCR considered the Commission proposal to be balanced but criticised the 
proposed harmonisation of accelerated and admissibility procedures. It called 
                                         
29 Position on EU Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to family 
reunification, COM (1999) 638 def., Caritas Europa, CCME, COMECE, ICMC, Brussel, 20 
March 2000, www.ccme.be. 
30 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 239-244. 
Tineke Strik 
 11 
upon stricter criteria regarding safe third country concepts and manifestly 
unfounded claims. A respondent of the Commission expressed his disappointment 
about these negative responses. According to him, the organisations did not have 
a clear picture of the national legislations, as the Commission proposal offered 
more protection than the national standards. If the proposal would have been 
adopted by the Council, the Member States would have to improve their 
standards. The respondent observed that by rejecting the Commission proposal, 
the NGOs had contributed to being side-lined by the Council during the 
negotiation process. The Council only took notice of the written comments they 
sent in for each Council meeting.  
 Comparing both draft directives, it becomes clear that the NGOs and the 
Commission were merely on the same side, but that the Commission was forced 
to take the Member States’ interests into account in order to preserve the content 
of its proposals.31 That this strategy implied alienation of the principles of the 
NGOs became evident during the revision of its proposals, which was meant to 
overcome the deadlock in the negotiations between Member States. In order to 
create any progress, the European Council had requested the Commission for a 
revised proposal, taking into account compromises already agreed upon by the 
Member States.32  
6. Going public 
During that revision process, the Commission worked closely with the Member 
States and left hardly any room for involvement for the NGOs. Its primary aim 
was to create sufficient support from the Member States with a view to reaching 
a common agreement. The result was not surprising: where the first Commission 
proposals were characterised by their compatibility with the positions of the 
NGOs, the revised proposals merely reflected the wishes of the Member States. 
The revised versions indeed had more support from the Member States, but they 
led to much criticism from the NGOs and UNHCR. 
 The distance felt by the NGOs towards the content but also the EU 
institutions forced them to reconsider their strategy. The respondent of CCME 
explained:  
The first two years I had the impression of an open debate, but that changed 
in the period from 2001 until 2003. Access to the negotiations became more 
                                         
31 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 402-405. 
32 Presidency Conclusions - Laeken, 14-15 December 2001, SN 300/1/01 REV 1.  
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difficult. This influenced our strategy: in the beginning we had more informal 
discussions, but later on we merely expressed our positions in public.33 
Regarding the Family Reunification Directive, ECRE expressed its deep concerns 
in a statement and CCME addressed the then Commissioner for Home Affairs 
Vitorino directly with a public appeal for the Commission to withdraw its revised 
proposal for the directive. On the eve of the Greek presidency Archbishop 
Christodoulos called upon the JHA ministers publicly not to hinder but to facilitate 
family reunification. He emphasised that long waiting periods harmed the 
children involved, as they would suffer longer periods of separation from one of 
their parents. Just before the JHA-Council was about to conclude a political 
agreement, the Meijers Committee wrote a public letter to Commissioner Vitorino 
also requesting him to withdraw the draft directive. After it became clear that 
they had not convinced the Commission and that the political agreement was 
concluded in the Council, the churches collectively expressed their disappointment 
about the decreased ambition level. They referred to the limited definition of a 
family, the age-limit and the waiting periods, and called upon the Council to keep 
the standstill clause in the directive (which would have refrained Member States 
from lowering their national standards to the minimum level of the directive) and 
the provision that Member States may adopt or maintain more favourable rules.34 
At the same time, CCME put pressure on the European Parliament to start an 
annulment procedure. The Meijers Committee supported the Parliament in 
formulating this request for annulment to the Court of Justice. This request, which 
asked for the annulment of three optional clauses that according to the Parliament 
violated Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights, was rejected by 
the Court. In its judgment, however, the Court emphasised that the directive had 
created a strong right to family reunification for third country nationals and had 
significantly restricted the sovereignty of the Member States. This was the first of 
a range of judgements that would force Member States to adapt their rules in 
favour of migrant families.35 The annulment procedure hence offered the Court 
the opportunity to give guidance to the Member States at a very early stage of 
the implementation process and to stimulate lawyers and national judges to take 
the right to family reunification seriously. As the Parliament had only recently 
gained the competence to initiate an annulment procedure in JHA-matters, the 
expertise and support by the Meijers Committee was very welcome and perhaps 
even decisive for the actual decision to proceed.  
 The criticism against the revised draft for the Procedures directive only 
emerged after the Council had restarted its negotiations. ECRE and Amnesty sent 
                                         
33 Strik, Asiel- en migratierichtlijnen, 63-70. 
34 Position on the Amended EU Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the right to 
family reunification, COM (2002) 225 final, Caritas Europa, CCME, COMECE, ICMC, JRS 
Europe, QCEA, Brussels, 17 December 2002.  
35 CJEU 27 June 2006, C-540/03, Parliament against Council. 
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a common letter to SCIFA (the management level of the national officials), and 
expressed their concerns about the negotiation results. Later on, ECRE accused the 
Member States of risking refoulement, and called upon the Member States to 
repair the serious protection flaws.36 The UN High Commissioner for the Refugees 
personally intervened during a JHA Council meeting, criticising the safe third 
country concepts and the derogations to the principle of suspensive effect. UNHCR 
expressed its fear that the Member States were negotiating towards the lowest 
common denominator, which could lead to a violation of the most crucial 
protection standards.37 In a public statement, ECRE supported the position of 
UNHCR.38 One month before the Irish Presidency presented a political 
agreement, ten European NGOs collectively called upon Commissioner Vitorino 
to withdraw its proposal, pointing out the gap between the content and 
international standards.39 UNHCR also warned that the agreement could lead to 
violations of international refugee law. After adoption of the directive, it called 
upon the Member States not to adapt their legislation to the minimum level of the 
directive, but instead to strive for sufficient safeguards and a high protection 
level for refugees. Its specific position, related to the advisory role towards 
national governments, however restricted the room for manoeuvre for UNHCR 
regarding responses and formulations in public. It found a modus operandi in 
cooperation with the NGOs, where each of them had an added value. In addition 
to the common public appeal to the Council by the ten NGOs, UNHCR did the 
same in its own appeal. According to the respondent of UNHCR, this was the 
outcome of a common strategy, whereby the organisations would maximize their 
influence:  
NGOs were not less effective than we were: they were more flexible and could 
sometimes say things that UNHCR could not. But we cooperated very well, on 
our positions but also on the timing of press releases and strategy.40 
So, the cooperation between the NGOs and the IGO was mutually beneficial, as 
they had the same objectives and both had limited opportunities. The overview 
of their actions over time shows that the NGOs, think tanks and UNHCR 
developed a similar strategy, led by a common increasing disappointment during 
                                         
36 ECRE, Refugee-NGOs in more than 30 European Countries reject Draft Directive on 
Asylum procedures, London September 2003, www.ecre.org. 
37 See also the Aide Memoire of UNHCR of 18 November 2003, 
 http://www.refworld.org/docid/402a2d6e4.html.  
38 ‘Appalling flaws in Directive on Asylum Procedures still not addressed’, Press release of 
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the negotiations. They regarded the first Commission proposal positively or 
slightly critically with a constructive tone, the second proposal very critically and 
at the end of the negotiations they sent out alarming messages trying to reach a 
larger audience.  
 There were eventually three reasons for the shift to a more public 
advocacy campaign. First, the Commission no longer functioned as their ally, as it 
was in need of the support of the Member States, who merely rejected the pleas 
of the NGOs. Second, they had only limited access to the Council, where the 
formation process actually took place. Third, the NGOs were increasingly 
dissatisfied with the way the draft texts were transforming; they included more 
national discretion and less individual safeguards and rights. As the growing need 
to influence the draft texts took place at the same that their possibilities to 
influence the process decreased, they decided to seek the support of civil society 
and go public. They tried to use their moral authority in order to mobilise the 
people, citizens who have the power to punish or reward their governments at 
the next elections. A clear example which occurred a few years later involved a 
public call to the Justice and Home Affairs Council for a fair and consistent EU 
Migration and Asylum Policy.41 In this statement, the organisation stressed that it 
represented different churches throughout Europe - Anglican, Orthodox, 
Protestant and Roman Catholic - and Christian organisations particularly 
concerned with migrants and refugees and declared:  
As Christian organisations, we are deeply committed to the dignity of the 
human individual created in the image of God, the concept of global solidarity 
and the idea of a society welcoming strangers. 
With the expression of these underlying principles, on which basis they called for 
the prohibition of criminalising irregular stay, the promotion of family life and a 
dignified return policy, they ensured maximum benefit from their moral authority. 
Politicians are obviously aware that members of a church may be sensitive to such 
declarations.  
 Their aspiration to put pressure on governments by influencing public 
opinion, however, was also frustrated as the mediaremained silent after the 
NGOs released their alarming public messages. The absence of public 
indignation exposed the weakness of the NGOs and even may have facilitated 
restrictive adaptations. NGOs did not succeed in compensating for their lack of 
power, as the lack of public support for their statements confirmed for the 
Member States that there was no need to take them more seriously. Maybe the 
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‘vote factor’ was not as significant as in other policy areas, since the migrants 
represented by the NGOs failed to threaten electoral change.  
           This move from insider to outsider tactics, as explained in the introductory 
chapter of this Special Issue was not the result of a long-term strategy adopted 
from the beginning, but it occurred more or less spontaneously for two reasons.42 
First, the more progress was made in the decision-making process, the more 
exclusion was experienced by the NGOs. The Commission became less admissible 
in order to protect the negotiation results, and the lack of access to the Council 
documents impeded a timely monitoring of the dynamics and detailed changes. 
The policy of the Council on accessibility was based on the idea that access might 
harm the interest of coming to common agreement.43 In response to my request 
for a Council document which included a discussion paper on safe third country 
concepts, I received a rejection with the following standard reasoning:  
Release to the public of this information would be likely to put the Presidency 
and delegations under additional pressure from stakeholders making it more 
difficult to reach a compromise. Full disclosure of the document would therefore 
be premature in that it could impede the proper conduct of discussions in the 
Council's preparatory bodies. It would affect the negotiating processes and 
diminish the chances of the Council reaching an agreement. Full disclosure of 
the document at this stage would therefore seriously undermine the decision-
making-process of the Council. 
So the Council policy was (and still is) a clear strategy to protect Member States 
against influence from lobbyists, although the EU General Court already in 2011 
demanded the disclosure of Council Documents regarding legislative procedures, 
as ‘the public right of access to documents is connected to the democratic nature 
of institutions’.44 Due to this strategy NGOs remained outsiders during the Council 
negotiations against their will. But their frustration about the limited effects of 
their insider tactic and the loss of the insider position which they enjoyed at the 
Commission and the European Parliament led to the decision to use this outsider 
position by seeking public support for their ideas. In their perception, the NGOs 
had nothing to lose, which is why the public campaign could not lead to a loss of 
influence for the negotiations either. As the special position of UNHCR only led to 
a few successful interventions, such as a reference to international obligations in 
the safe third country provisions, the shift from insider to outsider was also visible 
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for UNHCR, although non-accessibility was less obvious compared to the NGOs. 
Both the process behind their exclusion and the process towards lowering the 
standards to below what they perceived as acceptable actually unified NGOs 
and UNHCR in their public rejection. Even after adoption, UNHCR publicly stated 
that the Directive “may lead to breaches of international refugee law.”45 
7. Different tactics to break the bastion 
Influencing the Commission and Parliament was obviously rather easy for the 
NGOs and UNHCR because of the views they shared on the desirable standards 
on asylum and migration. Lobbying at the Council and the national delegations 
was a much bigger challenge. In the institutional context of the first stage of EU 
asylum and migration law, the Council was extremely powerful. By curtailing the 
influence of the Commission and Parliament, the Council downplayed the role of 
the NGOs and UNHCR as well. NGOs thus needed to have an effective strategy 
to ensure that their impact would remain for the adoption process by the Council. 
I identified five main reasons for the low level of their impact on the work of the 
Council.  
 First, the lobbyists from NGOs had less personal contacts with negotiators 
within the Council than with officials from the Commission and officials and 
Members of Parliament, although the Council had exclusive competence to adopt 
the directives. A respondent of the Permanent Representative of one Member 
State said: 
During my eight years of working experience in Brussels, NGOs contacted us 
only occasionally. There was this circuit of emails, but they did not come to us 
saying something like: “About the proposal you discussed: do you know that we 
made another proposal on that issue…?” No, they didn’t do that and I 
regretted that very much.46 
 
Especially in view of the power of the Council, NGOs’ inefficient network proved 
to be a major weakness. They had no formal access to this venue, but could have 
invested more in personal contacts with national officials representing Member 
States, working at the ministry in their capital cities or at the Permanent 
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Representatives in Brussels. The European and national divisions of the NGOs 
could have been complementary in that regard. The absence of personal contacts 
limited the chance to exchange information, but also to gain vital inside 
information about negotiation positions or dilemmas which could have been 
addressed by the NGOs.  
 Second, the timing made it difficult to have an impact on the negotiations, 
as the lobby was limited to written comments on compromises that the Council (or 
the working group, Scifa or Coreper) had already agreed. Reviewing these 
laboriously accomplished compromises was out of the question for the Council, 
which made the comments of the NGOs useless for national delegations. Some 
NGO respondents explained this by pointing to the lack of transparency, in 
particular the lack of access to the Council documents, which prevented them from 
making adequate and timely interventions. Some other NGO officials however 
said they were perfectly capable of following the negotiations because of the 
documents they received informally, which emphasises the importance of personal 
contacts with national delegations.       
 A third factor that limited their influence on the Council negotiations was 
that NGOs and national delegations did not have a common approach: NGOs 
based their positions on human rights, whereas the delegations served their 
national interests by maintaining national legislation and discretion. Promoting a 
higher protection level or harmonisation was not part of their real agenda. The 
NGO perspective had a clear common ground with the communitarian 
perspective of the Commission and Parliament, but not with the national 
perspective of the Council.  
 These divergent national interests led, as a fourth explanation, to many 
tensions at the negotiation table. It made the Council act in a cocooned 
environment which made them even less sensitive to external influences.  
 The fifth factor relates to the lack of a common language: where the 
delegations searched for solutions to concrete (procedural or operational) 
questions and dilemmas, the lobbyists held on to their positions that were based 
on general principles and objectives. As their position papers were not useful for 
finding the necessary detailed, precise and pragmatic proposals necessary for 
the Council: they enabled the negotiators to ignore them, or at least leave them 
to one side. Here the combination of timing and content created a misfit between 
the actors. Although the decision not to contribute to practical solutions is perfectly 
legitimate for NGOs, their lobby was perceived as having a permissive stance 
regarding the European Council decision-making process.  
 By way of exception, I met with one NGO official who drafted text 
proposals for national delegations, especially those from smaller countries with 
less experience in migration law. She gained influence by offering her expertise 
on refugee law and human rights law. This led to an exchange of information in 
both interests. It was the result of a confidential relationship, which she primarily 
built up with officials from the Permanent Representation, as they both lived their  
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daily lives in Brussels and frequently met on occasions like receptions and 
seminars. The advantage of this ‘behind the scenes’ tactic was that they had 
influence, the disadvantage was that they could not take credit for it. This 
exception may very well illustrate the dilemmas of NGOs: as long as they only 
focused on their principles, they could hardly influence the negotiations.  
 UNHCR also took another approach. Due to the formal role as a 
monitoring body of the UN, Member States had more obligations to respond to 
the UNHCR position than it had towards the NGOs. That may have been one of 
the reasons that UNHCR was more focused on cooperating with the Member 
States. The respondent of UNHCR pointed out the differences in that regard: 
Some NGOs are uncompromising and don’t want to become involved in certain 
debates. But we think that we are more effective by entering into the discussions 
with the Member States. It was perfectly clear that Member States would not 
leave out the third safe country concepts. In that case you’d better advocate 
for good safeguards than arguing against the whole concept. In general we 
strive for the  least harmful way that undesirable concepts are applied.47 
According to a respondent from the Commission, the UNHCR criticism on the safe 
third country concept led to draft sessions in the Council. In his view, the officials 
were successful in satisfying UNHCR:  
For us as the Commission the view of UNHCR was decisive for our judgment on 
the negotiation result. If UNHCR would be able to accept certain formulations, 
Vitorino would be able to respond positively at the press conference about the 
political agreement. This proved to be successful in the end.48 
Though these concessions did not prevent UNHCR from disapproving the political 
agreement, the Commission justified its own approval to the directive by referring 
to the involvement of UNHCR during the negotiations. This shows that the formal 
position of UNHCR may have led to more direct influence but also to contribute 
to the legitimacy of an instrument rejected by the organisation, at least partially.  
8. Multilevel lobbying: the national level  
As Member States were able to veto any Council decision on the directives, the 
position of each government was decisive. National NGOs however did not seem 
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to be fully aware of the opportunities it created for them in having a direct impact 
on the directive. This might be related to their underestimation of the 
consequences of the directive, which they had in common with parliamentarians, 
and to a large extent with officials as well. A respondent of the Dutch Refugee 
Council explained:  
As a national NGO we did not have the idea that we were able to influence 
the negotiations in Brussels. We felt quite powerless and hoped that ECRE could 
achieve more at the EU level. And in fact, we also believed that the directive 
would have more impact in other Member States.49 
As far as the national NGOs advocated for changes in the draft directive or the 
position of the Netherlands, they focussed on specific national elements. The 
priority of the Dutch Refugee Council was to abolish certain restrictions in the 
Dutch policy, such as the additional requirements for family ties and the time-limit 
of three months in which refugees had to apply for family reunification.50 It called 
the Dutch negotiation position into question, pointing out the exceptional character 
of the Dutch policies compared to other Member States. A respondent of the 
Dutch Refugee Council explained:  
We tried to show the Dutch parliament how isolated the Dutch government was 
regarding certain policy issues. Our hope was that the Netherlands would fail 
in Brussels, and that the directive would force the Dutch government to adapt 
its policy. At that moment we did not expect at all that a national ‘worst 
practice’ would become the European norm. This possibility really did not come 
to our mind.51  
The NGO hence seized the opportunity to lobby for a ‘normalisation’ of the Dutch 
policy through the directive. The advocacy was still nationally oriented, possibly 
due to a lack of awareness of the risk inherent to multilevel governance when 
Member States use the optional clauses meant to accommodate the interest of 
one specific Member State. Apart from this lobbying during the negotiations, the 
Dutch Refugee Council tried to provoke commitments from the government on the 
future transposition of the directive. According to the respondent, it was only 
during the last stage of the negotiations, that it really discovered the urgency of 
a lobby:   
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Initially, we didn’t see the need for a lobby as the Commission proposals looked 
very good and we did not expect the Member States to bring the draft 
directive to such a low level. But we immediately addressed the deteriorations 
we saw in the revised Commission proposal in 2002.52 
A respondent from the Dutch Refugee Council explained that the NGO had based 
its impression on the official parliamentary documents of the government, in which 
the parliaments were informed rather selectively. This may have contributed to 
the NGOs having overlooked the ‘race to the bottom’ effect: 
All Dutch NGOs have underestimated the domino-effect of national policy 
developments. We were therefore not so concerned about the ‘worst practices’ 
that appeared in the draft directives. Our impression was that the Member 
States negotiated very negatively and nationally, but that the Dutch 
negotiators were not to blame. We simply thought that they had little chance 
to achieve anything.53 
In Germany, the NGOs focused almost completely on the asylum part of the 
European harmonisation process. A large number of them cooperated in the 
platform ‘Memorandum’ for a common lobby on the German position in the EU 
negotiations. In parallel with the release of the first Commission proposal, they 
published recommendations for the European harmonisation of the asylum 
procedure, emphasising the need for compliance with the Refugee Convention 
and the European Convention on Human Rights, but also with the standards on 
protection as acknowledged by the Bundesverfassungsgericht.54 They responded 
rather critically to the first Commission proposal, emphasizing that admissibility 
tests and accelerated procedures are not compatible with the Tampere 
conclusions of the European leaders that stated that asylum seekers had the right 
to access the asylum procedure in EU territory.55 A respondent from Amnesty 
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expressed her frustration that all interventions, their letters, statements during 
hearings in the Bundestag, and their occasional talks with the Minister for Interior 
did not have any influence on the position Germany took during the EU 
negotiations.  
 This result may also have been caused by the rather passive attitude of 
the Bundestag. The Bundesrat however, which is composed of representatives of 
the governments of the Länder, was much more active towards the German 
governmental position and was even represented in the German delegation 
during the negotiations. According to the Amnesty respondent, the NGOs did not 
approach members of the Bundesrat as these politicians always aimed to make 
the German position more restrictive. The active role of the German NGOs 
towards the Procedures Directive contrasted with their silence on the negotiations 
on the Family Reunification Directive. They concentrated on the national reforms 
of migration law, but the Commission proposal served as an inspiration for their 
national lobby. The EKD (Evangelische Kirche in Deutschland, an organisation for 
the evangelistic churches) expressed its optimism on the proposal for the Family 
Reunification Directive, as it would strengthen the right to family reunification in 
Germany for beneficiaries of international protection, for German spouses and 
for minor children aged 16 to 18.56 After the Süssmuth Commission tasked with 
proposals for German reforms had proposed to introduce an age-limit of twelve 
years (children of twelve years and older had to speak the German language 
before admission), the EKD advised this commission to adopt the definition of a 
family as proposed by the European Commission.57 The lobby was followed by 
other German NGOs, but the resistance against the age-limit for children did not 
get through to the negotiations in Brussels.58 The respondent of the European 
Commission expressed his surprise that the German NGOs did not intervene on 
the German age-limit proposal, and assumed it was not in their interest to try to 
prevent this.   
 Like in the Netherlands, the involvement of the German NGOs only 
became apparent in Brussels after the Commission had released its revised 
proposal. One of the NGOs, the Juristinnenbund, concluded that its initial hope 
that the directive would correct the flaws in German legislation was replaced by 
the fear that the European standards would send the German rules on family 
reunification into a downward spiral. The organisation expressed its scepticism 
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about the hope of the Commission that the standards could be raised at a later 
stage.59  
 Many of the reasons for a limited impact I identified at the European level 
also apply to national NGOs. They shared with their European colleagues their 
concentration on the least influential actors. It must be noted that the coalition 
parties did not need to be receptive to their lobby, as their political choices 
emerged from heavy political support (the Netherlands) and delicate 
compromises (Germany). But the NGOs also seemed to limit their lobby at that 
level to the formal channels; just like their European colleagues, they had limited 
contact with the national officials negotiating in the Working Groups or Scifa. 
Their proactive and informal communication concentrated on the parliament, 
although parliamentary control was absent or at least ineffective. An analysis of 
their lobbying at the parliamentary level shows that even within the parliament 
they focused on the less active chambers (Bundestag and Tweede Kamer), and in 
them on the parties that already shared their views. Most of those parties 
belonged to the opposition, and the ones who were part of the coalition did not 
want to bind the government but preferred to leave room to the negotiators. 
Instead of trying to influence the decision makers directly, the NGOs relied 
heavily on their political allies in parliament, providing them with information and 
arguments.60  
 Another important explanation of their weak position is that the NGOs, in 
contrast with for instance employers, trade unions or industries, did not represent 
an electoral lobby for their governments.61 Nevertheless, one could imagine that 
they had valuable information to offer to national civil servants, especially those 
involved in the EU negotiations, for instance regarding legislation and practices 
in other Member States. Using these sources from their umbrella organization in 
order to better inform themselves or to gain influence did not form a part of their 
strategy. 
 Apart from these factors explaining the limited success of NGOs, their 
unfamiliarity with EU legislation has also heavily influenced their actions and 
impact As both directives were the first to be adopted at the EU level, they had 
gained no experience yet with (the meaning of) EU law. National NGOs were 
used to advocate or litigate at the national level or the level of the Council of 
Europe, of which the legal framework of reference significantly diverges from 
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the EU level. As a consequence, they underestimated the imitative behaviour of 
Member States towards more restrictive approaches, but also the protective 
effect of certain provisions and definitions. The mere fact that the adoption of an 
EU directive sets migration law in the EU framework (including the Charter on 
Fundamental Rights), in which the EU Court of Justice has the last word on its 
interpretation and the Commission supervises compliance by the Member States, 
already means a huge loss of discretion for the Member States. On the other 
hand, NGOs had only little knowledge of EU law (including case-law) and the 
implications of certain EU concepts. They shared this limited knowledge with the 
negotiating national officials. It was the Commission that took advantage of being 
the only actor aware of the consequences of the use of certain definitions and 
references to other areas of EU law and of adopting recitals in the preamble. 
Their underestimation concerned both the (restrictive) political dynamics of EU 
harmonisation as well as the (protective) legal consequences of it.  
 Both the German and Dutch NGOs focused on national legislation and 
underestimated the potential impact of the optional clauses in the directives. Only 
regarding the Dutch requirements on family ties and the German 
Drittstaatregelung they showed European awareness by using the multilevel 
decision-making in a strategic way. Their underestimation of the directives did 
not only concern the weakening effects, but also their potentially binding effects 
and the protection they granted to migrants and refugees. National officials and 
politicians had not taken into account this binding effect either. They thought that 
they did not have to adapt their national policy and could maintain their 
discretion. To everyone’s surprise however, the directives did not only fuel a race 
to the bottom, but also prevented governments from going even lower. Only when 
new ideas inspired by right-winged populists could not be realised because of 
the minimum standards of the directives, NGOs realised that harmonisation of EU 
migration law had also a limiting effect. In many regards the EU directives have 
raised the minimum standards compared to international law.  
 This awareness, which arose only after the adoption of the directives, 
made the NGOs finally embrace them and undertake actions to promote 
compliance. They presented complaints at the Commission, supported lawyers in 
their efforts to provoke a preliminary ruling from the Court of Justice and 
advocated at national parliaments to bring national policies into line with EU law. 
Van der Vleuten, who found that unwilling Member States only complied in case 
of pressure from both the supranational level and national actors, concluded that 
this function of NGOs is essential for compliance.62  
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9. Authority of NGOs 
As mentioned before, Schrover, Vosters & Glynn identify three forms of authority 
NGOs can have: expert authority, logistical authority and moral authority, 
depending on the size, age and status of NGOs.63 In this case-study, all three 
forms were potentially present.   
 Their expert authority was the most visible and useful, but as the NGOs 
apparently underestimated its value, they did not make full use of their expertise. 
In the field of migration, NGOs had possibly more expertise than they realised, 
on numbers, the situation in countries of origin, international standards but also 
the policies in the member states. They had access to information that is not 
always available to all negotiators but that NGOs have due to their umbrella 
construction. For example, Member States tend to hide the real objectives of their 
proposals in order to avoid objections. This was the case with the Netherlands, 
when it proposed to delete the provisions on fees, as this would be ‘too detailed’. 
The other Member States agreed, but a respondent of the German government 
admitted that if he had known at that time that the Dutch level of fees was ten 
times higher than elsewhere, he would have objected.64 After adoption of the 
Family Reunification Directive and the Long-Term Residents Directive, the 
Commission started an infringement procedure after which the Court of Justice 
forced the Netherlands to dramatically lower the level of fees. The Dutch 
government did not inform its parliament about its proposal to exclude a 
provision on fees, as it tended to describe its position in very general terms. NGOs 
could have shared the information on high fees in the Netherlands with its 
European colleagues, which would have enabled ECRE or CCME to make other 
delegations aware of this. Another use of the expert authority would have been 
if the EU-based NGOs had shared their information on the negotiations with the 
national ones, in order to raise awareness in parliament of the government 
position. The example of the German safe third country concept shows that such 
dissemination could lead to a mutually beneficial interaction between the levels. 
 Although some of the NGOs benefitted from their expertise on 
international human rights law, especially towards smaller national delegations, 
their overall lack of knowledge of EU legislation limited their possibility to 
influence the decision-making process. More expertise about the EU legal 
framework, but also more experience with the political dynamics related to EU 
decision-making, would have made them more alert to certain text proposals. A 
timely observation of these proposals would also require access to the 
negotiating process. On the other hand, however, more expertise on the EU legal 
framework would not have led to a better access to the negotiators, as national 
officials and NGOs had conflicting interests in this regard.  On the contrary, they 
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could take more advantage of not sharing this knowledge with the national 
officials, just like the Commission sometimes did.  
 So, expertise which NGOs could benefit from requires knowledge and 
information which the negotiating officials and the Commission or actors 
controlling the negotiators (like national parliaments or the European Parliament) 
may benefit from in a way that also contributes to the objectives of the NGOs. 
This mutually beneficial information may concern factual knowledge of specific 
national situations or national case-law (in order to ‘warn’ other member states 
or parliaments), or expertise on refugee law or human rights law, including 
international case-law.  Regarding logistical authority, I distinguished two forms. 
Their umbrella organisation structure allowed the NGOs to gather relevant facts 
and expertise and transfer it to other levels: data on numbers, national policies, 
law or case-law. Another kind of logistical authority involved the capacity to 
organise publicity and mobilise people supporting their position with a view to 
strengthen their influence. As already mentioned, their efforts did not lead to the 
publicity nor to the public support that they envisaged. By confirming a lack of 
public support to mobilise on such issues, the Member States’ tough positions were 
validated, meaning that this strategy actually had a counterproductive effect.  
 The NGOs used their moral authority while lobbying for EU legislation in 
line with human rights obligations, particularly those deriving from the Refugee 
Convention, the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the 
European Convention on Human Rights. With more principles such as dignity, 
solidarity and the Christian duty to welcome strangers, churches took the moral 
high ground during their interventions. As previously observed, this authority was 
recognised and used by the Commission and Parliament, but hardly by the 
Member States and Council. The formal role of UNHCR strengthened its moral 
authority, which had some impact during the Council negotiations, especially when 
the Commissioner’s approval depended on the position of UNHCR. That their 
moral authority lacked a clear impact on the public debate can be explained by 
the highly politicised debate on asylum and migration. Their public statements 
probably confirmed the opinion of people already in favour of a more migrant-
friendly approach, but failed to convince others.   
10.  Discrepancies 
There is a discrepancy between the objectives of the NGOs and their actions, 
which partly explains their limited impact. If we look at the formal decision-
making process, it becomes clear that they did not focus sufficiently on the Council, 
and their actions towards the Council were not sufficiently tailor made (in time, 
content, and contacts) to produce an effective response. One of the formal 
obstacles they experienced was the lack of timely access to the, continuously 
changing, documents that were negotiated upon. These Council documents were 
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labelled as ‘Limité’, implying that their access was limited to directly involved 
officials. The European Parliament lacked formal access as well, and each 
national parliament depended on arrangements with its government. In the 
framework of a formal approval procedure, the Dutch parliament received the 
Council documents of legislative proposals discussed in the Council. The actual 
negotiations however took place at the level of officials, and were completed 
before they were placed on the agenda of Council meetings. As the adoption of 
the directives by the Council immediately bound the Member States, national 
parliaments had to exercise their power parallel to the negotiations. They 
struggled with the limited number of documents they had access to, but also with 
the prohibition to share these documents with third actors. Their inadequate 
information network did not only lead to deficiencies in the parliamentary control 
but also prevented civil society from becoming involved. The negotiations ‘behind 
closed doors’ hence inevitably affected the level of democratic legitimacy of the 
EU asylum and migration policy.  It not only hindered NGOs from following the 
negotiations and responding effectively, but also failed to raise the interest and 
awareness of the public and to mobilise the necessary public support for their 
actions. So apart from the highly salient level of the debate on asylum and 
migration, the public ignorance of what was going on in Brussels kept the NGOs 
in a rather isolated position.     
 When the directives needed to be implemented at a national level and 
parliaments had to adopt legislation which transposed the directives, national 
NGOs actually became more involved and were more successful in creating 
publicity and reaching civil society. Also, at that national stage, they could have 
benefitted more from the umbrella structure, for instance by warning for worst 
practices from other Member States. In 2006, the Dutch government introduced 
the obligation to pass an integration examination abroad, before a family 
member was allowed to reunite with his or her spouse in the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands had managed to insert this condition in the Family Reunification 
Directive. Four years later, the German government adopted this Dutch condition 
without paying attention to the effects. German NGOs however could have 
learned from their Dutch colleagues that it had led to a significant drop in the 
number of visas issued and the number of applications for family reunification. 
The German debate focussed on the constitutionality of this condition, more 
specifically than on the question if it would form an obstacle for family 
reunification. Although the recent Dutch experience would have informed this 
discussion, it was not brought to the fore.  
11.  After Lisbon: has the role of NGOs changed?  
My analysis of the role of NGOs concerns a period in which the decision-making 
process on asylum and migration legislation had a highly intergovernmental 
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character, which led to the Council having the most decisive role in dictating the 
final outcome. This context has obviously implied some limitations for the role 
NGOs could play, especially while the European Parliament was much more 
receptive of their positions but had less influence. It is therefore relevant to 
consider if the factors that determined their level of impact are still applicable 
since the Treaty of Lisbon changed the decision-making rules. Since then, the 
Council decides according to the ordinary legislative procedure as set out in 
Article 294 TFEU, on asylum and migration instruments. This implies effectively a 
two-chamber legislature, with the European Parliament and the Council as equal 
actors. Member States have to seek support for their proposals much more 
actively than before: with the other Member States (due to the qualified majority 
system) and with members of the European Parliament.  
 This procedure has opened up more venues of influence, since the 
amendments of the European Parliament can no longer be ignored. But this venue 
is not only used by NGOs anymore: since the EP gained more power, Members 
of Parliament are pressurised more by their own governments. Their new position 
seems to have made them less receptive to NGO lobbying, more particularly that 
related to human rights. Despite the formal equality between the Council and 
Parliament, the Council still exerts much more power, as it is able to confront the 
Parliament with a package deal, making it hard for the EP to change major things. 
At that stage and within the space left for the Parliament it will need technically 
suitable amendments, which may only lead to minor improvements. The increase 
of the EP’s power may also have shifted the focus from a collective institutional 
interest to the different interests of the political parties. This change in attitude 
may imply a relationship between the power of the actor and the extent to which 
this actor is sensitive to advocacy or influence of NGOs. At the same time 
however, the composition of the Parliament has also changed, which is reflected 
by an increasing call for national sovereignty and restrictive migration policies. 
Like their likeminded Member States in the Council, political groups favouring that 
direction usually show limited interest in human rights advocacy by refugee 
organisations.   
 The qualified majority voting system means that it is no longer possible for 
one Member State to stick to its position without trying to find support. Member 
States have to be more pro-active and must try to form coalitions for their 
proposals. In theory this would leave more room for lobbying, but in practise 
officials have learned that they should come up with information and text 
proposals themselves. The extent to which NGOs can participate, for instance by 
offering revealing important information or improving text proposals, still 
depends on the match between ‘supply and demand’. But their access to 
information remains crucial: in order to keep up with those dynamics, their access 
almost needs to be done in ‘real time’. In its judgment Access info Europe versus 
Council of 2013, the Court of Justice recalled the consideration of the General 
Court that ‘in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of 
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Europe, in which decisions are taken as openly as possible and as closely as 
possible to the citizen,.65 With this argumentation, the Court ruled that Member 
States should grant public access to their legislative documents. This ruling and 
subsequent case-law however has not yet stopped the Member States from 
keeping their cards against their chests.66 However, the case-law combined with 
pressure from the parliaments and the EU Ombudsman has led the Council to 
negotiate on its procedures on the disclosure of documents.  Beginning 2019 the 
EU Ombudsman O’Reilly applauded the European Parliament for adopting the 
Ombudsman’s recommendations on transparency and accountability:67  
The vote will help convince national governments - in this most important EU 
election year - to agree to make EU law-making more open, so the public can 
see who is really taking the decisions.68 
12.  Conclusion 
This overview of the struggles and strategies of NGOs trying to influence 
decision-making on asylum and migration shows that these processes are not so 
accessible and transparent as they might look like from the outside. On the 
contrary, the fact that the lobbying takes place in public is rather an indication 
of the lack of access and transparency, which forces NGOs to access the media 
and influence the public debate. My research shows that NGOs changed their 
strategy over time, gradually shifting from an insider to an outsider perspective. 
This was not a freely chosen strategy, but was mainly related to the shift in 
institution they targeted. During the first stage of the process, the Commission 
played a prominent role as the initiator of the draft legislation. Because of the 
congruence between the preferences and aims of Commission and NGOs, the 
Commission was receptive to the lobbying of NGOs and UNHCR. They provided 
the Commission with information and arguments and helped to legitimise the 
Commission proposal. Also, with the European Parliament the organisations had 
a close relation, which led to the incorporation of their text into the parliamentary 
amendments. But from the moment the Council was in the steering position, its 
                                         
65 CJEU 17 October 2013, C-280/11, Access info Europe versus Council of the European 
Union, recital 27. 
66 See also General Court 22 March 2018, case T-540/15, De Capitani v. European 
Parliament, on access to documents of trilogies between the Parliament and the Council. 
67 European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2019 on the Ombudsman’s strategic 
inquiry OI/2/2017 on the transparency of legislative discussions in the preparatory 
bodies of the Council of the EU, P8_TA(2019)0045. 
68 Magazine ‘The European Parliament’, 22 January 2019,  
 https://www.theparliamentmagazine.eu/articles/news/ombudsman-welcomes-
parliament’s-support-transparency-work. 
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strategy to conceal the negotiations led to a loss of access and influence by the 
NGOs (and UNHCR to a large extent), which forced them to change their tactics. 
They took advantage of their outsider position by strongly condemning the 
lowered standards the Council was to adopt. So their lack of influence grew 
parallel to the alienation between their position and the position of the Council. 
This also caused alienation between the Commission and the NGOs, as its aim to 
reach an agreement among the Member States did not leave any room for 
outside influence. The influence civil society had at the initial stage of the process 
disappeared during the Council negotiations. The main reason for this was 
because the Council almost had exclusive power to adopt the directives.  
 The NGOs’ outsider tactic was not successful either, as their strong press 
releases did not cause strong public outrage and opposition, or strong political 
opposition in the national parliaments, despite the display of their moral 
authority. Their criticism was not broadly shared, perhaps because the 
negotiations were an abstract phenomenon, but also because the restrictive 
tendency in the Council reflected the restrictive policy changes in the Member 
States. The governments’ positions were carried by a majority in their 
parliaments. Shifting into an outsider tactic is irreversible, but the NGOs shifted 
to it at a moment they had already lost their influence from the inside.     
 This conclusion does not mean that the NGOs did not use their authority. 
They had moral, expert and logistical authority at different moments and venues. 
The Europeanisation of asylum and migration has created more possibilities to 
benefit from their expert and logistical authority, as their multilevel cooperation 
and exchanges offered them a unique source of information. As the processes 
under study included the first migration directives adopted at the EU level, their 
skills to make full use of it were also at an initial stage. Their experience and 
growing capacities, as well as the institutional changes that took place under the 
Lisbon Treaty, have expanded their possibilities to exercise influence. But 
Member States and Parliament have become more experienced as well, and 
Parliament’s receptiveness has diminished due to its growing responsibility and its 
changes in political composition. Compared to the negotiations fifteen years ago, 
the political climate has enlarged the gap between the aims of NGOs and 
UNHCR and the political preferences of governments and parliamentary 
majorities. Just like then, NGOs use their moral authority to try to touch the hearts 
and consciousness of the public. The emergence of social media and other 
technological developments has enabled them to put a human face on 
immigration. But what is also new is their confrontation with public counterparts, 
proficient in responding to the fears of certain voters. The debate has become 
harder, more visible and polarised, but that does not say anything about the level 
of influence. In this harsh climate, where basic human rights of migrants can be 
threatened, we see NGOs trying to pursue different strategies such as Search 
and Rescue activities and monitoring at the borders, but also strategic litigation 
on the national level and the European Court on Human Rights. Their tendency to 
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file complaints at the European Commission is gradually increasing. These are 
other ways to influence the outcomes through expert and logistical authority, but 
with less dependence on political decision-making and more on independent 
courts. However, in order to influence migration policies, they should remain 
attentive to the political debate as well, as the room for interpretation by the 
European Courts also depends on the support of legislators and thus, the political 
decisions taken.    
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